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ABSTRACT
Fu, Baiwei.
Department of Economics, Wright State University, 1996. Entrepreneurs
and Entrepreneurial Development in State-Owned Enterprises Reform in China: Problems and
Corruption.

The report focuses on microeconomic reform in China, especially on entrepreneur
problems and corruption in State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs). China has about 145,000 SOEs
employing 113 million people. State enterprises account for 70 percent of fixed assets but only
34 percent of industrial output. The total state enterprise debt is greater than China’s bank
deposit base. In some cases, SOEs are unable to afford to pay worker salaries or make pension
payments. Reforms caused large-scale lay-offs and plant closures in recent years.
Entrepreneurs’ corruption contributes negative effects to SOE reform. Corruption is one
way of getting around political control and poor property rights but causes problems of its own.
Poorly defined property rights in China are one reason for corruption in SOEs. The Chinese
government is being pressured to reform the inefficiencies of the enterprise system, including
entrepreneurial development in SOEs. Though China has worked to develop new plans and to
improve existing plans of reform in the past 10 years, over-employment, inefficiency,
entrepreneurs’ corruption and state-agency problems continue to contribute to poor performance.
The SOE reform has become the central link in economic restructuring m China. The Chinese
government is no longer considering whether to implement further reform in SOE, but how.
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Ciapteir Omeo

While China's economic performance has been widely praised around the world, the
country faces serious challenges at the macro and micro levels. By the late 1980s, China had
established a comprehensive modem industrial system predominantly in State-Owned Enterprises
(SOEs), a system that was capable of producing a wide range of products and domestic consumer
goods. Although China’s long-term industrial growth rate has been one of the highest m the
world, China has paid a price due to SOE problems. Chinese industry has suffered from
fundamental weaknesses that have made it very inefficient. In order to attain economic growth
along with stability, China has achieved its phenomenal economic boom by applying a policy of
gradual state enterprise reform, rather than Shock Therapy. China is widely seen as a model for
successful economic reforms as it attempts to establish a successful socialist market economy.
One of the most important remaining issues in China’s transition to a market economy is
SOE reform. When reform started m late 1978, SOEs dominated China’s industrial sectors.
After 21 years of gradual transition, the SOE’s share in China’s total industrial output has
declined from 77.6 percent in 1978 to 28.8 percent in 1996. However, m 1996, due to inefficient
labor-intensive production techniques, SOEs still employed 57.4 percent o f urban workers and
possessed 52.2 percent of total investment in industrial fixed assets. China has about 145,000
SOEs employing 113 million people. State enterprises account for 70 percent of fixed assets, but
only 34 percent of industrial output. The total state enterprise debt is greater than China’s bank
deposit base (Economic Condition & Forecasts, Sept. 1998). In some cases SOEs are unable to
afford to pay worker salaries or to make pension payments. Because of inefficiency and low
productivity, and the need to shift from Soviet-style extensive growth to intensive growth based
on improved resource allocation, SOE reform has become a high priority m China. This reform
can be understood as an effort to shift from a system in which planning and administrative

directives guided the allocation of resources to one in which allocation is determined by the
market. China is nurturing 120 of its larger state enterprises. The remaining 304,000 small and
medium-sized state enterprises are being released from state ownership and left to sink or swim.
Improving SOE performance is crucial for social stability and sustained growth in China
(Business China, June 1997).
Reforms have caused large-scale lay offs or plant closures in recent years. The problem
of laid-off workers in SOEs was the other major topic at a national conference on May 15, 1998.
China’s new Premier Zhu RongJi pointed out that mass layoffs were unavoidable and necessary
for China’s economic reform and development because SOEs have had many years of reckless
investment, overproduction and capital starvation, and poor technology. Bankruptcies and layoffs
have become widespread as the market economy forced the state sector to increase its efficiency,
and as banks are no longer required to lend money to state firms at a loss. But these were positive
actions for China in the long term. Zhu RongJi also promoted training centers to help re-employ
laid-off workers. The enterprises are responsible for providing laid-off workers with basic living
expenses, social insurance payments and training fees. Central and local authorities will also
supply funds to meet social insurance payments (China’s Digest, 1999).
It appears that the need to reduce government subsidies and to raise investment capital
has taken precedence over political concerns in order to make enterprises more efficient. The
Chinese government plans to phase out the ‘modem enterprise system’ pilot program initiated m
1994. (The program helped SOEs reorganize and supplied them with capital.) In 1998, the
Chinese government laid out a new plan to implement a shareholding system within SOEs that
would transfer stock to ordinary citizens or to organizations. It is still unclear to what extent the
authorities are prepared to let individuals participate and prosper in the market. Other major
obstacles confronting China’s securities markets stem from lack of rational pricing and
production, but establishing the stock exchange marks a significant step forward m China’s
attempt to reform its economy (Journal o f Economic Issues, Sept. 1997).

Entrepreneurial development, agency problems, and SOE corruption are the top issues for
the current government. China cannot become a modem nation until it changes the mindset of its
bureaucrats and leams the art of dealing with officials and people, especially state entrepreneurs.
Except for low productivity, entrepreneur problems such as corruption, bribery, and other
wrongdoing were not serious before the reforms because of the absence of managerial autonomy.
The increased competition of a market economy should have eliminated or at least mitigated
these agency problems. However, agency problems in SOEs have worsened in spite of the
intensification of competition. Some entrepreneurs in large SOEs, who were appointed by the
state government, transferred huge amounts of state-owned property to themselves. This was an
abuse of their managerial power. A few of them escaped and fled overseas. Corruption m top
management of SOEs negatively affects SOE reform.
Corruption is one way of getting around political control and poorly defined property
rights. This has negatively impacted the Chinese reform process. Poorly defined property rights
in China are considered a principal cause of corruption in SOEs. Bribery is the major cause of
SOEs5 corruption. Bribery is common in about 80 percent of SOEs. At a national conference
sponsored by the Chinese government m 1998, corruption in SOEs was one of the major topics.
The Chinese government is experiencing pressures to reform inefficiencies m the enterprise
system, including entrepreneurial development in SOEs. Although China has worked to develop
new and to improve existing plans o f reform in the past ten years, over employment, inefficiency,
entrepreneurs5 corruption and state agency problems continue to plague many SOEs. SOE reform
has become the central link in economic restructuring in China. The Chinese government is no
longer considering whether to implement further reform in SOEs, but rather how (China News

Ctoapfer Two: M&maglmg tie Transition f© a Market Economy:
SO® Reform Burdens and Obstacles

L Reform Burdens Put SOEs in a Less Competitive Position in a Market Economy

During the economic reform process SOEs have encountered many burdens, including
the following:
(1) The capital intensity of many large SOEs is too high, despite capital scarcity, due to
political decisions. SOEs cannot survive without reform if they have to pay market-determined
interest rates and face market competition, especially competition from the capital abundant
economies. In the first few years of reform, both SOE investments and working capital came
from interest-bearing loans and fiscal appropriations. Government protection was gradually
eliminated in the 1990s. In a capital-scarce economy the capital-intensive industries are not
internationally competitive. However, the state views such capital-intensive industries as
strategically important to the Chinese economy and so SOEs are instructed to operate within
those industries. Capital intensive SOEs employed more than 50 percent of urban workers and
possessed more than 50 percent of total investment m industrial fixed assets in China in 1997.
This put SOEs in a less competitive position internationally (International Financial Law review,
May 1997).
(2) SOEs bear a heavy burden of costs for retirement pensions, other social-welfare costs
and for redundant workers. Before reforms the state adopted a low minimum-wage policy. The
wage was only enough to cover an employee's current expenses. The SOEs were responsible for
their employees' retirement pensions, housing, medical costs, and other needs. The cost of these
benefits did not impose any extra burden on the SOEs because the state covered SOE
expenditures by fiscal appropriation. However, after managerial reform, SOEs have had to be
responsible for the wages and social welfare not only of the incumbent employees, but also for

their retired workers. The older the SOE is, the more retirees it has, and the heavier the financial
burden from pensions and social-welfare expenditures. Before reform, capital-intensive
industries did not create enough jobs for urban residents. SOEs were forced to employ many
redundant workers who became a heavy burden during SOE reform (European Economic Review,
Sept. 1990).
(3)

SOEs5 output prices are still distorted. Before reform the prices of energy, raw

materials, and other products or services, which were considered as inputs to heavy-mdustry
projects, were artificially suppressed. After two decades of reform most prices have been
liberalized. However, the prices of energy, transportation, and a few other products are still kept
below the market equilibrium level. These prices often cannot cover production costs.
The above policy-induced burdens put the SOEs at a disadvantage in competing with
non-state enterprises. Because each SOE was established at a different time, each has a
somewhat different technology and capital intensity, as well as a different number of retired and
redundant workers. Therefore, the impact of such policy on the competitiveness of each SOE is
different. Competition among the SOEs or between the SOEs and non-state enterprises is not the
same as m a traditional free market economy. In addition, the expansion of the managerial
autonomy of SOEs will worsen agency problems because state agencies have power over
entrepreneurial development. Bribery, corruption and abuse of power will spread in SOEs and
state agencies.
The state should be responsible only for SOE losses that arise from policy burdens.
However, m a planned economy, it is hard for the state to distinguish between the policy-induced
losses and operational losses caused by mismanagement. The top management of SOEs will
always attribute some losses to the state's policies, no matter if the losses are due to government
directives or to their own poor management. Consequently, m practice, the state becomes
responsible for all SOE losses. As a result, the budget constraints of SOEs will become soft and
m turn worsen the moral hazard, managerial slack, on-the-job consumption, and other agency

problems. To correct such agency problems the government must alter the relationship between
ownership (capital investment) and control (management of SOEs).
Although by definition the state owns the SOE, the state cannot operate an enterprise by
itself. Rather, it needs to delegate control to the enterprise's managers. The separation of
ownership and control is a common feature of any large modem corporation m China today. Due
to this separation o f management and enterprise ownership, the success of any SOE reform
depends on the issues of incentive incompatibility and information asymmetry. These problems
often arise because of the enterprise's inability to overcome these problems. In practice qualified
management in large state corporations is either impossible or prohibitively costly to obtain. Due
to the free-rider problem individual entrepreneurs have no incentive to improve their management
skills. In China, state enterprises do not have real owners m the same sense that property rights
are viewed m the West.
Government reform will be necessary to mitigate existing problems encountered in the
current SOE reform. Market competition cannot exist when the government owns the SOEs and
state agencies assign top executives and managers who risk their jobs if they do not follow
government rules. In a true market economy the success or failure of the CEO, as well as his
personal wealth, is directly linked to his company’s profitability. As long as the problems of
control and property rights exist, managers do not have any incentive to improve company
performance. This is the root of SOE problems in China.

2. Surplus Labor and Debt Problems in SOEs

Reform in the labor system of SOEs has not been very effective m improving worker’s
incentives and discipline, or encouraging more efficient allocation of labor. The lifetime
employment system in state enterprises is fundamental in making labor reform more difficult,
along with the concomitant burden of providing social services to workers. Allocation of labor

remains the least reformed part of the system. At the beginning of the reform movement, most
newly hired regular workers in state-owned industrial enterprises were given fixed-term (usually
three-year) contracts. This measure was intended to increase labor discipline, strengthen
performance-based incentives for workers, and weaken the traditional “iron rice bowl” system,
under which workers were effectively guaranteed the right to keep their jobs for their entire
career. This measure was intended to make labor contracts renewable, allowing workers to be
terminated based on their performance. In practice this rarely happens. A more important
development was the authority given to managers in the m id-19905s to better control their work
force withm the SOEs, by taking surplus workers out of production and segregating them in
separate teams engaged in miscellaneous tasks or training. Any labor contract changes will
require modifications to how worker pensions, housing and social welfare benefits are derived. It
still remains difficult to terminate regular employees in SOEs.
The shift from labor intensive, Soviet-style to intensive growth based on improved
resource allocation and advanced technology has caused a huge amount of surplus labor m SOEs.
In 1995, China’s 340,000 SOEs employed more than 110 million workers but contributed less
than 30 percent of the country’s industrial output compared to 62 percent in 1986 (Asiamoney,
Dec 1997/Jan 1998). According to a 1995 survey conducted by the International Labor
Organization m conjunction with China’s Ministry of Labor, the labor market is faced with
problems of increasing “surplus” labor in SOEs. More than ten years after reform of China’s
employment system began, the private sector has been unable to absorb the state sector’s surplus
labor. Because the SOE still has little control over labor recruitment in China, the burden of
social welfare will increase costs. There are more than 300,000 SOEs in China employing 110
million workers, a number nearly equal to the entire U.S. workforce. These SOEs are a drag on
the economy. At least 40 percent of them are unprofitable. Consequently, China permits massive
layoffs at these state companies. Furthermore, the labor force grows annually by 15 million
people with more than 100 million already unemployed. Massive unemployment will create

major political problems. The reason is that if the government permits layoffs at SOEs, workers
will lose theirbenefits from SOEs, which they depend on to survive, resulting in dangerous social
instability. China’s SOEs must generate programs to help unemployed workers and their families
with housing, transportation, education, healthcare, recreational activities, and pensions in
economic reform.
Another problem facing China’s SOEs is their staggering debt. The state banking system
is reeling under a SOE debt burden currently estimated at US$600 billion. O f this, US$125-$180
billion is probably unrecoverable. The emergence and development of markets m China have
increased market competition and caused difficulties for many SOEs. This problem has become
more serious in recent years. It is estimated that more than 45 percent of the SOEs are losing
money. In the past several years, China lacked a policy solution for the SOE problem. In 1996,
the government developed a plan and specific measures to reform the country’s SOEs
systematically. The government plans to solve the SOE problems in about four years. Through a
policy known as ‘grasping the large, letting the small go,’ the government has developed different
strategies toward large and small SOEs. For large SOEs, the government plans to support and
develop a number of large or super large SOEs in each industry. The new Chinese government
intends to help larger SOEs become profitable by retaining shareholdings in roughly 1000
industrial SOEs. Smaller SOEs, meanwhile, will be allowed more flexibility. The general idea is
to transform these firms so that they operate and develop, or else die under market competition.
This has allowed government to reform the largest SOEs in a very short time (The Economist,
Nov.1998). For example, in the electronics industry, the government will support six large
Chinese firms. In 1996, the government supported a total of 300 large SOEs and fifty-seven
conglomerate groups. By the end of 1998, it will have increased its support to 512 large SOEs
and 120 conglomerates. Moreover, the government has chosen six super large companies from
this group for additional assistance and intends to help them find a place among the 500 largest
companies m the world by the year 2010. These six companies are m the steel making, home

appliance, electronics, ship building, and pharmaceutical industries. The government has
instituted favorable policies to support the development of large SOEs. For example, the
government will help these firms cooperate with foreign companies to acquire advanced
technology. Some firms enjoy tax benefits. In addition, the Chinese government plans to spend
some $5 billion to absorb the bad debts of these large firms (People ‘s Daily, January 20, 1998).
For small SOEs, the government has adopted a Tet go' strategy. The government does
not plan to support these firms, instead letting them die or grow under market competition. The
government will allow small SOEs that are unprofitable to go bankrupt or to transfer ownership
to private owners or employees. The government also encourages successful Chinese as well as
foreign companies to acquire or merger with troubled small SOEs. In some cases, individuals can
lease small firms for a few years and then transfer the ownership to the manager. Without
government control, many small firms will become truly private firms (People (s Daily, January
21, 1998).
The 1997 economic reforms have been implemented to enhance the overall performance
of State Enterprises, satisfying an objective of the Chinese government this year. Under this
reform, the Chinese government will release the strict control it exercised over large firms under
the old central planning system. These companies will enjoy a high degree of autonomy so they
can operate m competitive markets. Most of these firms can issue stock, with the government
serving as a shareholder. The government will help these SOEs issue some $12.5 billion of stock
(People’s Daily, December 18, 1997). To support large SOEs, Beijing also intends to revise
bankruptcy laws, the system of contract responsibility, and public shareholding.

3. SOEs Internal and External Problems
After almost two decades of economic reform most large-scale state enterprises still
operate under state control. From the Chinese political and historical point of view, the internal
and external environments of an enterprise would not allow entrepreneurship in SOE.
Entrepreneurial studies m China have increasingly earned a more significant and
important role alongside economic reform. Under a planned economy the country and its people
own both the SOEs and its property. The system does not allow state entrepreneurs to take risks
and enjoy the wealth they generate. The definition of a socialist entrepreneur is rather
controversial and is even more complicated in China. From the historical point of view, the
Chinese culture did not encourage entrepreneurship. China possessed no real entrepreneurs m
SOEs under the planned economy because the market exchange mechanisms and profit retention
did not exist. All the factory managers were approved by or assigned by the state government. In
other words, they were just government officials who took charge of an enterprise. The economic
and production responsibility system never allowed factory managers to take risks and enjoy the
wealth they generated. (Li, Yinrng., Jan 3-5, 1989).
In that way competition was suppressed and profits ceased to be the measure of an
enterprise’s efficiency. Because of the lack of market discipline, managerial discretion was
potentially a serious problem. Managers of state enterprises lacked autonomy to mitigate
problems. Under the government control, the production of state enterprises was dictated by
mandatory plans and was furnished with material inputs through an administrative allocation
system. Government agencies controlled the circulation of their products. The wages and
salaries of workers and managers were determined not by their performance but by their
education, age, position, and other criteria according to a national wage scale.
Internal Problems encountered by state entrepreneurs include the following:
a. Poor communication
b. Poor management and development strategy

c. Poorly educated employees
d. Out-of-date technology

External problems include the following:
a. Slow sales and poor working environment
b. Policy burdens and administration controls
c. Ill-defined property rights

The following comments are illustrative for both external and internal problem
experienced by SOEs5 managers:
"We suffer from slow sales, poor technology, insufficient capital injection and poor
working environments. Everything is obsolete: the factory, the plant, the product and the
workers as well. We have been operating in the red for a long, long time. I suggest some
strategic moves to rescue the enterprise. However I face criticism and negative
comments from colleagues."

They resolve their problems by employing some strategic measures.
"I decided to transform my factory. On the manufacturing side, I drop all old products
contract out the low margin obsolete products and invest capital to produce new
products. On the sales side I maintain a tight control over the sales team and restructure
the sales organization. Implementing a straight commission system instead o f straight
salary system to motivates my salesmen. These measures should secure sales and proper
cashflow. First, I resolve to stick by my decision, as I strongly believe that it is the only
way to rescue the enterprise that has been running at a loss account for a long time. I
use current data, both internal figures and external market demand, to justify my
decisions. In addition, I seek support from my superiors—the government officials in the
Industry Bureau for 'arbitration'. Both workers and opponents then give up or keep
silence. I hope the strategic management, improved marketing and good communication
skills are effective measures to resolve these problems.

It seems that strategic management, marketing flavor, advanced technology, and good
communication skills are effective measures to solve these problems.

4, The Characteristics and Problems o f SOEs5 Entrepreneurship

Political/Regulatory Environments and Strategic Orientation

As China slowly becomes integrated into the world economy, the relevance of Western
models becomes a practical matter (Peng & Heath, 1996; Shenkar & von Glmow, 1994; Tan &
Litschert, 1994). Since China differs from Western countries in culture, society, and political and
economic system, it potentially represents the most serious challenge to the managerial paradigm
developed and empirically tested primarily in the West. Furthermore, since more people work for
organizations m China than in any other country, there is a gap between different institutional
environments, including economies in transition. The question for the Chinese government is
how to fill this gap by examining the relationship between regulatory environment and
entrepreneurial strategic orientation in China, an economy undergoing transition toward a marketdriven economy.
SOEs’ entrepreneurship can be divided into specific activities within a macro or a micro
view, yet all address the conceptual nature of entrepreneurship (Aldrich & Wiedenmayer, 1993).
The micro view examines the socialist entrepreneur’s personal characteristics that have
identifying traits and behavioral orientations that are common to successful entrepreneurs. Some
of the identifying traits and behavioral orientations are innovation, opportunistic orientations, and
education level. Success depending on individual entrepreneurs has been challenged by
individual ecological thinking. Which argues that the search for a single psychological profile of
the entrepreneur is bound to fail according to the numerous counter examples m the most SOEs.
Instead, the focus of the macro view is on environmental factors external to the
entrepreneurial business, which are capable of creating or destroying entrepreneurship by the
nature of the climate they establish (Aldrich & Wiedenmayer, 1993). The environmental context

refers to those sets of circumstances, government actions, and macro vs. microeconomic policies
that impact the strategic orientation of the entrepreneur. The external processes are sometimes
beyond the control of the individual For example, the Chinese government gave the private
sector equal status with the state owned sector. It was a major change. The non-state sector including private enterprises, collectives, and join venture companies - is booming. It accounts
for 70 percent of China’s gross value of industrial output, while the share of state enterprises has
declined to 28 percent m 1996 (Mariko Hayashibara, p34). Entrepreneurs perceive the political
and regulatory sectors to be the most influential, most complicated, but at the same time the least
predictable among the several environmental factors that affect strategic decisions. (Aldrich &
Wiedenmayer, 1993). Underdevelopment of state entrepreneurial activities is clearly rooted m the
political regime and government policy in China. It is important to examine entrepreneurial
orientations within the specific environmental contexts in which strategic decisions are made
instead of just counting failures of individual state entrepreneurs. Therefore, the macro view of
entrepreneurship presents a broad array of factors that relate to success or failure m SOE reform.
The principal challenge of the macro view is to predict the environmental circumstances that
influence SOEs’ entrepreneurial decisions.
Although policymakers have been struggling for two decades to reshape China's top
executives as efficient players in a competitive marketplace with state enterprises, entrepreneurs
still have to face constant pressures both from government and market competition since reform.
The following are a few examples:
(1) Golden Summit, one of the most successful companies in the mid-sized city of Shan
Xi in western China, is owned by the state, as is Dadu River Steel. Bai is a deputy
manager, a senior engineer and an accountant. He has been running the steel mill ever
since it was opened and now is taking it over, even though it offers no personal benefits
for him, only headaches. "To put it nicely, I was helping the government overcome its

difficulties. I am loyal to the party and state government" he says. "You could also say
that I “w as forced to do it."
(2) Golden Summit Joint-Stock Co. Ltd. is an SOE that has undergone wave after wave
of reforms. First came bonuses to motivate workers and managers, and then came
foreign investment, followed by public stock offerings to raise capital and expose the
company to market pressures. However Golden Summit's experiences suggest that as
long as the state remains the major shareholder, local officials are apt to make it
impossible for managers to focus on purely commercial goals. Therefore it will be hard
for state companies to compete with multinationals, which have fewer political burdens.

In summary Golden Summit and Golden Summit Joint-Stock Co. Ltd cases point to the problem
of too many of government’s "mothers-in-law" interfering with SOE operations and strategic
orientation. This is one of the problems of which Beijing is aware. The Chinese government
must solve this problem as long as the State remains determined to keep a core of companies m
state hands. Clarifying ownership is the first step toward limiting the demands government can
make.
The term 'entrepreneur5 as defined in SOEs is both controversial and complicated m
China. An expectation from the government is that top SOE executives in China are those who
are attempting to take risks and to assume responsibility in order to create personal wealth as well
as profit for the country and party. They may be the founders of new enterprises or may be the
managers m traditional state-owned or collective enterprise. In practice, there is a big gap
between the government’s definition of entrepreneur and the actual practice in China.
Compared to entrepreneurs m the West, state corporate managers have their own 'way' to
achieve a single goal m China: the modernization of China. They are not actually real
entrepreneurs according to the western definition. Top executives in western countries are those
who attempt to take risks and to assume responsibility in order to create personal wealth. The

term ‘entrepreneurship5 is capitalistic in nature, and it may make sense to conceive of the
entrepreneur as an individual who is opportunistic, proactive, action oriented, value driven, risk
accepting, and whose creative ideas take the form of organizational birth, growth, or
transformation (Bird, 1989). Entrepreneurial development was not active in The Peoples
Republic of China (PRC) before economic reform. “The merit of Chinese managers’ tradition is
their concern for their people and country. They know that the prosperity of the country is a
prerequisite for a supportive and favorable environment to develop their enterprises. Their fates
have virtually become merged with that of the country and the people”(C hina’s Digest, Feb
1997). They place less emphasis on their individual wealth. Many SOE entrepreneurs, even as
they climb to managerial positions, still live in the small house allocated to them many years ago
and earn almost the same salary as their employees. They use part of the retained profit to build
apartments for their employees rather than to allocate it as a bonus. Their personal wealth
increases very little. They stress the economic performance of these factories. For example, Ma
Shenli, one of the first 20 outstanding SOE top executives in paper manufacturing, was paid only
$200 Chinese yuan after he retired. He found it difficult to maintain his former living standard.
And his was not a special case. The following are excerpts from a 1984 speech by Wang Guangymg, a typical entrepreneur with ventures m Mainland China and Hong Kong between 1940 and
1990. He is also the brother-in-law of Liu Shaoqi, president of China in the 1970s. The speech
reflects the state of contemporary corporate entrepreneurship in China.
"The tradition o f Chinese entrepreneurs is the spirit o f arduous struggle and defying hardships. In
old China when the country was in the abyss o f misery SOE top executives, like other Chinese
people were harshly suppressed and exploited. It was under these adverse circumstances that they
came to realize that only with dedication, courage and perseverance could they survive and grow ”
(Chi Ying, p23.).

After the failures and successes of almost 20 years of managerial reforms m SOEs, state
government now places severe budget constraints on SOEs that are trying to improve their

performance through gradual privatization reform. However as long as government policies
remain the same, and even if the SOEs are privatized, the state cannot excuse itself from policyinduced losses, and the lack of budget constraints will persist during the reform process. In order
for reform to be effective it is necessary to remove the burdens of present government policy and
to provide SOEs with a level economic playing field. Enterprise improvement measures can be
introduced to counteract government policy. One possible way out for top executives is to
oversee the managers’ actions directly and to reward the managers according to their managerial
efforts.
As soon as it gives up control the state is no longer accountable for SOE failures and can
thus impose hard budget constraints on them. Without state subsidies state corporate executives
can resist unnecessary political intervention in their operations. Certainly a level playing field
does not guarantee that state corporate performances will necessarily be good. If an SOE fails to
perform well other enterprises will have the incentive to take over, replace managers, improve
efficiency, and profit from the takeover. Without government interference the SOE should be
able to make a normal profit with a normal management strategy. It remains to be seen whether
privatization is m fact, necessary for improving the efficiency of contemporary SOEs (Asian
Business, Jan. 1998).

Chapter Three: Managerial Problems and Corruption
1. T i e Root of the SOE problems

One explanation for the government’s lack of enthusiasm toward developing real
entrepreneurs is socialist ideology, still upheld today. The root of SOE problems is the separation
of ownership and control, and the often-criticized soft-budget constraints that arise from various
state-imposed policy burdens, which make the state accountable for the poor performance of

SOE’s. Some problems facing Chinese entrepreneurs are political in nature and some are related
to the government’s macroeconomic policy. While responsible for profits and losses, corporate
managers defer to state regulations as long as the state retains control or else they risk being fired.
In order to foster entrepreneurial development the government must provide a more supportive
business environment and give CEOs more control. Figure 1 illustrates the standard managerial
hierarchy for SOEs in China. After two decades of reform some large state enterprises still
operate this way (GuangzbouJkufyMeMs, July 1999). The key to successful SOE reform is to
remove governmental policy burdens and to create a level playing field so that competition in the
market place can be used to judge managerial performance and make m anagers5 incentives
compatible with the market.
Figure 1, Managerial Hierarchy for SOEs in China

Although, by definition, the state owns SOEs, the state cannot operate them by itself and
needs to delegate their control to the enterprises' managers. The separation of ownership and
control is a common feature of any large modem corporation in China. Due to this separation,
the issues of incentive, incompatibility, and information asymmetry often arise between the
managers and the owners. State agency problems such as moral hazard and managerial slack and
discretion may surface. The success of any large corporate institution depends on its ability to
overcome these problems. Intuitively, one possible way for the owners is to oversee the
managers5 actions directly and to reward the managers according to their managerial efforts
(Alchian and Demsetz, 1972). In practice, total observation of managerial actions in a large
corporation is either impossible or prohibitively costly. Moreover, the owners of large
corporations are numerous. Because of the free-rider problem, any individual owner of a firm
will not have the incentive to oversee the detailed activities of the firm.
The large Chinese corporation does not have owners in the same sense as in the propertyrights literature. For example, an institutional investor may own a large share of a firm m the
West. However, m China the institutional investor is the government, whose state agent may not
have incentives to adequately monitor managers. Additionally, the owners o f the institution's
funds may not have incentives to monitor the institutional investor either. Incentive
compatibility between the owners and the managers can be achieved m two ways. The first is
direct, where the owners can design a managerial labor market about-compensation schema that
is based on the industrial average or on the rank of the firm ’s performance in the industry
(Holmstrom, 1982). The second is indirect, where a firm 's performance in a competitive market
provides a signal to the managerial labor market about the manager’s talent and behavior, and the
signal determines the m anager’s future wages (Fama, 1980). Access to sufficient statistical
information will aid in these tasks. The prevalence of large SOE corporations in the market
economy indicates that some institutional arrangements like direct and indirect ways to mitigate
the state agency problems exist..

2. Entrepreneurs5 Social Responsibility, Family Stress and Business Ethics
Four issues have been identified that must be solved for SOE reform to succeed:
a.

The Social Responsibility of SOE and Business Ethics. SOEs have been small

societies on their own. On behalf of the state, they bear various social responsibilities for their
employees, from housing and medical care to retirement payments. For example, in a glass
factory m North China with 6000 members, there are 3000 retired workers whose medicine costs
alone are twenty millions of Yuan per year. With such heavy financial loads, SOEs find it
difficult to compete with market enterprises (Brown, 1996). After almost twenty years of
economic reform, new business laws and rules, increased unemployment, serious environmental
issues, and other issues call for ethical discussion, whether one approves of reform or not.
In addition to these factors, the influence of foreign business ethics, the inheritance of
Chinese traditional ethics, and the influence of Marxist philosophy and ethics should be
discussed. In traditional Chinese ethics the relationship between 4Y i’ and X T is a very old and
recurrent topic. ‘L i’ means benefits or profits and 4Y f refers to the principle or norms of
obtaining and distributing benefits or profits. So 4Y i5 as the core notion in Chinese traditional
ethics has an indissoluble bond to 4L i’ (Cheng Lin, 1993). The connection between them is
expressed by the deep-rooted Confucian view th a t4a person of noble character can understand Yi,
but a low person only knows Lib Although Confucians are not completely against 4L i’ they want
to p u t 4Y i’ into 4L i’ or to achieve 4L i’ in a moral way. The relationship o f 4Y i’ and 4L i’ turns to
the central question of business and ethics. Its related concepts became the questions of
entrepreneurs’ efficiency and fairness, desire for material reward and social ‘requirements of
moral or spiritual norm s’ {Journal o f Business Ethics, Oct., 1997). For example, it is important
for enterprises to realize that offering good quality and reliable products to their customers and
providing a healthy and safe working environment for the staff are important goals. Given the
connection between 4YT and 4L i’ or business and ethics for an enterprise must solve the problems

of fair rewards, working conditions, and efficiency for its employees. According to the Statistical
Yearbook o f Ghina, there were more than 38,000 industrial fires in 1993 as a result of
management’s lack of concern for its workers. These fires caused nearly 2,500 deaths
(Guangzhou D aily News, pp 1. 1999).

b. The Responsibility of Enterprises for the Environment. The issue o f environmental
pollution is serious. Some firms and managers are not aware of their responsibility for the
environment. Some have the awareness, but lack the necessary funds to protect the environment.
Recent changes m environmental laws show some concern for the environment. However, there
is still much to do on the part of both businesses and government.
c. Ethical Issues o f SOE Management. One SOE manager defines his concept of
‘success and failure ‘w ay5 for managers5, which is a Chinese term to define his management
experience, and which may be a reflection of others, as follows:
"’Way ’ should have a goal, try to reach the goal and be aware o f the risks. It pays off...I have
participated in the economic reform and this supports economic development which in turn
improves the quality o f people’s lives and living standards in our under-developed country. My
business experiences would be useful examples for the followers. Newcomers may gain from my
good or bad experiences, no matter failure or success. They will then find a better ’road’ or 'way'
that leads them to success and keeps them away from failure."
“First, I try my very best to meet the target or quota set by the Industry Bureau. This is the first
and most important objective o f a state entrepreneur. Second make all contributions to the
society, party or country, not to individual persons. I receive the same compensation as general
workers even though I make more effort and no matter how much profit the enterprise has made"

It is not strange that SOE managers pay little attention to personal objectives such as
wealth and financial reward. When personal objectives conflict with social objectives, managers
find a way to get out of the government controls. But the controls and regulations then give rise
to corruption opportunities. The simplistic view of corruption is that all politicians and
government officials -like everyone else - are constrained self-maximizers. Therefore, they

establish or maintain regulations and controls with the intent to facilitate corruption. Under
private enterprise, where resources are transferable and movable, competition limits the ability to
corrupt. However, in state enterprises, limiting corruption through competition is difficult. Take
the example of price controls in China. With the exception of farm price supports in the United
States, most price controls are set below the market price. Why is this true? It is because it is
relatively uneasy for corruption to exist when the controlled price is above the market price.
Take steel m Beijing as an example. The controlled price is one-third to one-half of the market
price. Certain officials are entitled to rationing power over steel. They have the opportunity to
make gams derived from this power to ration, because the price of steel is controlled below the
market price. According to the magazine Chinese Entrepreneurs, half of the first outstanding 20
entrepreneurs in the 1980s escaped overseas to avoid prosecution, or are behind bars because they
transferred huge amounts of money to foreign countries or into their own accounts (Xiang, p 32).
d.

In the Chinese culture the SOE M anager’s Family is a Critical Issue. Added pressure

is placed on managers5 families because they work long hours and do not have regular vacations.
Managers must work longer hours than their employees, and travel extensively for business
purposes. They must bear pressure from both from the government and the market. Because they
have to travel out of town frequently, they have to cultivate ‘Ren Gi Guan X i5, a Chinese term for
close connections with local government officials and others who have business relationships
with them. They do not have much time for their families. One female SOE manager
commented, “One third of my time is out of town on business. I feel pain when I cannot stay
alongside my mother and father when they are passing away. I also feel great guilt and sadness as
I cannot take care of my children and thus they are poor in health and perform poorly in school55
(GuangZhou Daily News, 1999).

3. Entrepreneurs5Corruption
In, 1997, five or six well-known executives who had been outstanding during past SOE
reforms were arrested for mismanagement. Others resigned, while some fled overseas, and a few
committed suicide when they faced pressure from state government. In China, people named
1997 as “corruption’s year” (China’s Digest, p 21). What happened then? Why are these people
who used to be successful m business failing today? What defines corruption m SOEs?
The simplistic view of corruption in China is that all politicians and government officials
- including SOE m anagers- will do anything for personal gain. They take chances, transferring
SOE property and financial resources to themselves. Under the Chinese economic system such
property and resources properly belong to the people and the country. In fact SOE managers do
not have any special rewards connected with their successful efforts. They are paid almost the
same as other employees. Therefore, they establish and maintain regulations and controls with
the intent of facilitating corruption, which then becomes a major source o f income for them. Are
they just greedy? Some economists in China feel that the socialist system o f property rights
encourages corruption. In a private enterprise system, where resources are transferable and
movable, competition limits corruption. However, for Chinese enterprises limiting corruption
through competition is difficult because there are no certain property rights.
Sometimes corruption can help offset the inefficiencies of a planned economy or
hierarchical system in SOEs, because the state government must pay attention to the system’s
shortcomings as the economy makes a transition toward private property. However the danger is
that corruption will become institutionalized. Managers and market competitors cannot limit
corruption m a system of complete control without guaranteed property rights. Without the
guarantee of property rights and financial rewards, managers will lack motivation to improve
their business, and are more likely to focus on the maximization of their own benefits instead of
on their enterprise’s profits or social goals. In conclusion, the imbalanced growth caused by

gradually changing the planned economy into a private property market system will not lessen
corruption. It-may, in fact, worsen it (The Economist, May 1997).
Since 1978, the Chinese economy has combined these two systems. Top SOE executives
have faced and experienced a more complicated business environment than their counterparts m
the West. The Chinese government is developing a “system of separation of two rights in SOE
reform” - meaning the separation of management rights and owner rights and trying
fundamentally to reform and change the SOE system.
The first is a system based on private property rights. Under this system, rights and
privileges are ranked according to the property individuals own without regard to politics. How
many cars you can buy depends on your property rights over resources. Poorly defined property
rights are a sensitive issue m China. All resources and property belongs to the country and
people, but the problem is that a resource becomes overused when too many agents have the
rights to use it. Due to poorly defined property rights state entrepreneurs have no incentive to
operate a business under strategic management guidelines. The major reason for inefficient
resource allocation of resources to SOEs is that politicians and bureaucrats have excessive control
over much of the economy. Establishing property rights is, therefore, equivalent to reducing
political control over top executives, managers and employees in China. Inefficient structure and
control of rights and poor enforcement of contracts in the SOE are two aspects of the current
property rights problem (Cato Journal, Fall 1996).
The second is the socialist economic system in which rights are determined by
hierarchical ranking (Refer to Figure 1). It has nothing to do with whether one is wealthy or
intelligent. The most important factor is obedience to the state agent. The question is by what
standard of success or failure is the efforts of SOE entrepreneurs measured today? In fact the
standards vary and do not consider human rights. It will take a long time to reform the socialist
system in present-day China, because people often try to circumvent the law. Reforming the

political and economic systems simultaneously would be the ideal solution, including the
establishment j)f an unbiased judicial system (International Journal o f M anagement, Dec. 1997).
Moving from a hierarchical ranking of rights to one of private property rights is painful,
especially since it would preclude corruption, which is endemic to SOE management today.
Since 1979, China has faced a lot of problems in merging the systems. To define a system of
private property rights is difficult enough. Systematically preventing corruption is even more
difficult. Present-day corruption is based on locality or territorial rights, on classified commodity
rights, on classified trade rights and others. The only effective way of getting rid of corruption
among SOE executives is to get rid of controls and regulations. Conversely lack of all controls
may encourage other kinds of corruption. As things stand today, controls and regulations may be
created and/or maintained by politicians, thus facilitating corruption. Therefore, the prevention
of corruption must rest on the successful establishment of a system under which government
controls and regulations are minimal. This is a system of well-defined property rights, creating a
true market-economy system. Beijing implemented the “modem enterprise system” pilot
program m 1994. The program sought ways to save 2,700 SOEs from financial collapse -100
designated by the State Council and 1,700 chosen by local government - by helping them to
reorganize, implementing market competition, freeing them from housing and medical care
responsibilities for their employees, and giving entrepreneurs proper rewards for their efforts.
The program, however, has been criticized for the lack of improvement in these operations,
despite preferential treatment (Hayashibara, p v34n6).
In China corruption is similar to that in other developing countries. Corruption occurs at
all levels of government and management and so is almost impossible to control. The type of
corruption m China is spread from the bottom of management to the highest-level management.
“Exchange of money and rights” is common among state enterprises and government bribery is
common among managers (Qi, p 2-3).

Chinese Entrepreneurs magazine has a survey of “Excellent Entrepreneurs Award
Winners of 19€8” (Economic Management 1988) and “ 1989” (Economic Management) in China
that investigates the SOE’s top executives. O f the first twenty excellent top SOE executives
interviewed, only four are still in their management positions. O f the others, one has died, one
escaped overseas, five retired, and six quit or were fired by state government. Three became state
governors. For some reason they were successful for a period of time but finally failed. They
bribed state agencies to maximize their own personal gain. The survey revealed that most SOE
managers thought their enterprises failed not only because of strategic management problems, but
also because of China’s property rights system and interference by the government (China News
D igest p 16-18).

Chapter Foun Summary and ReewnmemcMIemc
L Summary
In 1999 the H ong Kong Standard reported that the Chinese Communist Party would
adopt a policy to separate management and ownership of the SOEs as a key step to modernize
them (Gilley, Apr. 9, 1999). An economic researcher in the State Development Planning
Commission said that the separation was also an important and effective measure to carry out the
withdrawal of government from state enterprises. Such fundamental reform would cause a whole
set of changes m other existing policies regarding personnel, salaries, and employment, as well as
determining the role that the Communist Party plays in state enterprises. According to an official
source, reform needs the party's support in harmonizing various party and government
departments. The pending plenum of the party's Central Committee, to be held in late September
1999, is expected to approve the policy. In a keynote address on June 26, 1999, to leaders of six
eastern provinces, President Jiang Zemin gave priority to the separation of management of state
enterprises from their ownership. This was the fourth of Jiang Zemin's speeches on state-owned

enterprises this year. In his speech Jiang said that while the state enjoys the rights and benefits of
owner and investor, it should not get directly involved in the operation of an enterprise. Nor
should the state bear unlimited responsibility for an enterprise. According to the proposed
reform, a board of directors is to be established in large state enterprises. The board will consist
of representatives from the Communist Party committees and other relevant government
departments. The board will choose the management through open competition. M anagers9
performances will be measured by goals and objectives defined at hiring (Saywell, Dec. 1998).
The year 1999 has been a good one for China's economic development. China attained
an 8.3 percent gross domestic product (GDP) growth rate for the first quarter m 1999, according
to the governor of China's central bank in Macao. Governor Dai Xianglong was optimistic about
meeting the seven percent annual growth target, taking into account a slowdown in the second
quarter (Jing. p 17).
At the same time China’s economic transition also reached a critical stage. Significant
internal developments were and still are forcing the government to consider more aggressive
reforms. Meeting some of the government's greatest challenges has already begun. These
challenges include SOE reform, sustaining economic growth and coping with the Asian financial
crisis. Overcoming these challenges will have a critical impact on China's economic transition
and development in the next decade.
SOE reform and the development of a market economy in China have increased market
competition, but at the same time caused difficulties for many SOEs. This problem has become
more serious in recent years. It is estimated that more than 45 percent of the SOEs in China are
losing money. In previous years China lacked a definite policy to deal with SOE problems. In
1996, the government developed a plan to systematically reform SOEs. The general idea is to
transform these firms so that they operate and develop profitably or else go bankrupt under
market competition. One initiative, announced by the State Council in April 1997, entails setting
up a special task force to deal with bankruptcies caused by SOE mergers and with the resultant

problems of unemployed workers. The task force will have the authority to shut down
unprofitable firms and to auction off their assets. The Chinese government appears to be
facilitating the bankruptcy process by allowing liquidation of assets (Cheung, p. 1-5).
The government has developed different strategies toward large and small SOEs. The
government plans to support and develop a number of large or super SOEs in each industry (the
government calls this "grasp big" policy.) For example, in the electronics industry, the
government will support six mega - firms. In 1996, the government supported a total of 300 large
SOEs and fifty-seven enterprise groups. By the end of 1998, it had increased its support to 512
large SOEs and 120 conglomerates. Moreover, the government has chosen six companies from
this group for additional assistance and intends to help them find a place among the 500 largest
companies m the world by the year 2010. These six companies are in steel making, home
appliance, electronics, shipbuilding, and pharmaceutical industries. In total, the government plans
to support some 1000 large SOEs or groups in the near future (People’s D aily, January 20,1998).

2* Recommendations

First is the Chinese government should relax its strict control over SOEs. The
government should also permit SOEs to enjoy a high degree of autonomy so they can operate m
competitive markets. SOEs should be able to issue stock, with the government serving as a
shareholder to support their operation. The key for successful SOE reform is to remove
bureaucratic regulations and to create a level playing field so that market competition can prevail.
Capable managers should share in corporate profits. For a long time the government has
functioned as a "helping hand" for economic development, promoting economic growth.
Government power is exercised through coercion in order to shape the enterprise and the behavior
of top executives m SOE. For example, the government should permit the managers of each
selected enterprise the flexibility to reorganize as they see fit, without being responsible for the
social welfare problems of a downsized work force (Liao, Sept/Oct 1997).

Second, the Chinese government must design a program to support the development of
SOE reform. For example, the government should have strategy policies to help SOEs cooperate
with foreign companies to acquire advanced technology. In addition, the Chinese government
has to have plans to manage the bad debts o f SOEs to make these companies become key players
in their respective business sectors.
Third, a corporate bankruptcy law should be promulgated in China and implemented on
a trial basis. While local regulations exist in some areas, the new law should be aimed at making
SOEs more fiscally responsible. Bankruptcy law implementation in China will increase its social
cost, with massive layoffs and unrecoverable debt. To be successful the government will have to
support the bankruptcy laws and create training centers to assist laid-off workers.
Fourth, because property rights depend on the nature of their reallocation, the state should
shift management responsibility for SOE operations from government officials to top SOE
executives. Stronger financial incentives that effectively increase the entrepreneur’s income will
result in improved output of the SOE. Decentralizing the central government’s fiscal policy will
provide incentives for local government to form "township and village enterprises”, in which top
SOE executives will take responsibility only for their businesses and will be freed from
responsibility for the social welfare of their employees. This will aid the local economy, which in
turn will help reduce unemployment. Property-rights reform must be associated with
decentralization and devolution of government economic authority. Authoritarian property rights
in China are known as “fiat property rights” in contrast to “evolved property rights”. Fiat
property rights do not rely only on government decree, but also depend on the careers of
individual politicians. In general, property rights are either lacking or ill-defined. A major policy
change of China's central government has shifted some decision-making from higher levels of
government down to local governments and, in some cases, even to individuals. However, the
central government retains the prerogatives to administer, adjust, and even to revoke these
policies and regularly demonstrates these prerogatives. As such, the new fiat property rights are

not evolutionary developments, but little more than adjustments within the framework of China’s
autocratic tradition. China's post-1978 property rights laws continue to be a fundamental
determinant of property rights allocation for SOEs.
Finally, the Chinese government must enforce Intellectual Property Rights (DPR) in all
enterprise sectors. Increased enforcement has produced noticeable results such as raids against
pirate CD factories. IPR violators have to been fined and imprisoned to prevent IPR abuse. It is
important to have a sustained campaign to disseminate IPR rules to government officials and to
enterprise managers in order to make them aware of IPR issues. The emphasis on state-centered
enforcement highlights problems of technical proficiency and training in IPR issues, as the state
becomes the primary source for and consumer of technical knowledge for all businesses and
individuals. Further, as state officials have had to decide which of the increasing number of
violations receive a portion of the limited resources, corruption and influence-peddling have
grown, which in turn has effected the consistency of IPR enforcement. Moreover, state-centered
enforcement makes economic factors dependent on the good will of state agencies, hardly a
circumstance likely to contribute to the emergence of a market economy in China. It is still too
early to reach conclusions on the extent to which criminal penalties are imposed and on their
possible deterrent effect on business and individuals if managers do not really understand the
concept of individual property rights.
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